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PEKING AND THE WORLD:
ON, CHINESE COMMUNIST
FOREIGN POLICY*

s OM E' ~ THOUGHTS'

HENRY

G. SCI-IWARZ

FAC:I;NG THE OUTSIDE \VORLD _WAS ,SOlVI~TpIING' IN, WI-IICH, THE

Communists-had no experience prior to i949. They had .already
governed for years, at first only in a few hamlets. in the "least
accessible parts of the' wild' mountain ranges of Kiangsi province,
later for some years over large areas in the north comprising more
than ninety million peopleo The new elite had also acquired superb
experience in the arts or war having just emerged successfully
from a long and arduous civil war.
They even had become
slightly acquainted with the peculiar problems concerning nonChinese ethnic groups. But foreign affairs presented, for all
practical purposes, a brand-new challenge. The occasional contacts
with foreigners, like Edgar Snow and Colonel Barrett, that Mao
had in the caves of Yenan hardly sufficed to give the new leadership
a sure footing in world politics.
Foreign affairs also was a new area of responsibility in which
the Communists exhibited very little interest. "T'he clumsiness
with which they took up the business of diplomatic relations
betrayed not so much inexperience as downright indifference. In
a way, this attitude was understandable, In the first place, the
life-and-death struggle with the national government just concluded
had absorbed most of the new leadership's energies. Triumphant
but weary, it felt that it should and could concentrate on the
immediate tasks of domestic reconstruction rather than on the
establishment of foreign relations. Such course of action seemed
safe enough. After all, seen through the prisms of Communist
analysis, the new leadership had little to fear from the outside
in 1949. The Soviet Union was already an ideological ally and a
hoped-for source of massive material assistance. As far as enemies
were concerned, no other power in East Asia seemed to threaten
Presented as a lecture on February 25, 1965 at Rizal Hall University of
the. Philippines, .Padre. Faura, Manila),' as part of a..seri.es;"of·' fO:t-1.r:.leQ~ures
-on Communist ,Cb~na sponsored .1Jy -the 'Institute 9£ Asian. 'Sti"tdies":
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the new leadership. The Nationalist government had taken refuge
in Taiwan and was in no mood to stage a comeback in the near
future. Japan was disarmed and occupied by the United States.
And America herself, while opposed to the doctrines of the new
leaders in mainland China, had already turned her back on her
former Kuomintang ally. In the well-known White Paper of 1949,
released to the public before the final defeat of the government
troops all the mainland, the United States specifically denied any
responsibility for the impending disaster. All blame was placed
squarely on the Nationalist government, and all aid to and protection of that government were suspended. The "new China" thus
seemed secure and could safely, at least for the moment, postpone
the task of foreign relations in favor of rebuilding a ravaged land.
But the roots of this relative indifference go deeper. During
the calmer periods at Yenan. before the Japanese war broke out,
Mao devoted himself to, some writing and contemplation. In the
pieces he wrote on subjects not related to immediate problems,
there is little evidence that Mao "vas much interested in the outside
world. Likewise, since take-over Mao has never traveled widely,
not even within his own country. Whatever first-hand knowledge he
possesses includes, besides his native Hunan, the ethnic home of
the Cllinese, or roughly the area between Peking and Canton. To
put it different, considerably 1110re than one-half of the Chinese
territory is unknown to him except through reports and hearsay.
Moreover, it is accurate to say that Mao Tse-tung has traveled less
than most other statesmen in the world today. For example, the
leaders of Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi have far more extensive
personal knowledge of the outside world than the present leader of
mainland China. It is not that Mao is ipso facto misinformed, with
all the dire consequences that this entails for policy formation
in Peking, Certainly there have been persons who, despite the
lack of any personal knowledge, managed to acquire accurate and
comprehensive information about far-away places. What seems
certain, however, is that Mao's apparent indifference to foreign
affairs, typical of rather than unique among Chinese leaders of
any age, is the reflection of a very deep-seated ethnocentrism.
Chinese reluctance to join international politics has had several
other major 'reasons. Firstly, the Chinese had' been historically
inclined to consider China as the center of the universe. This view
made good sense because, with few exceptions, foreign powers bad
indeed been very much China's inferiors in almost all respects.
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Culturally speaking, only India could approach ancient China in
terms of achievement. Buddhism, which deeply affected Chinese
culture originated in India. All other states in Asia were considered
culturally inferior by China. Japan, for example, did not develop
an elaborate culture until late ill history and then it was almost
wholly based on Chinese culture.

In military matters, non-Chinese occasionally enjoyed
superiority and twice, during the Mongol' and Manchu periods,
managed to occupy all of China. But no conqueror was able
to reshape China in his o"vn image. It is not surprising, therefore
that the prevailing form of international relations during most of
China's long history was a tributary system. States surrounding
China were subject to its imperial control. Obviously, thedegree of
control varied from time to time and frame state to state, depending on the relative strength. On the emperor's interests, some
states were governed as if they were integral parts of China while
others were virtually independent. Mongolia and Burma during
Emperor K'ang Hsi's reign are two cases in point. Mongolia was
ruled by Chinese governors supported by military garrisons at Urga
and Kobdo, Governing the Mongolian dependency" in this
manner differed in no important respects from Chinese control
over Sinkiang after that area had become a province of China.
On the other hand, Burmese rulers sent only about every ten
years tributary missions' to the Peking court while other states
sent similar missions at more frequent intervals.
II

Still another major reason for the reluctance of Chinese
governments during the past one hundred years to fully participate
in Western-stlye international relations rests with the principles
of the system as well as with the way in which it "vas introduced
into China. The central idea of present international diplomacy
is the legal equality of all states and thus, of course, 'completely
contrary to Chinese historical practice. Moreover, soon after the
first sustained contacts ill 1840) the Western powers deliberately
disregarded the existing power relationships between China and
her neighbors and imposed their views on international relations
upon weakened empire. It is easy to see why Chinese considered
this new type of international relations as unrealistic and insulting.
The Europeans, for their part, obviously held a contrary
opinion with equal conviction. After all, the system was their
invention. More importantly, the concept of legal equality of
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states, as expounded by Grotius and others, made sense in that
small part of the world; in fact, it was little more than the formal
acknowledgment of an already established practice. After the
break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, no single state was strong
enough to enforce its will for any length of time upon the others.
In order to avoid utter chaos, the dozens of tiny political units
in Europe had agreed to regularize trade relations on the basis of
equality. Later, when Napoleonic France did become the predominant power, the idea o.f equality had already taken root so that
it not only survived the grande armee but was strengthened and
codified by the Congress of Vienna.
But Grotius was not Confucius, and the Western notion of
international relations was decidedly not a reflection of practices
in the East. From 1842 when the first treaty (Treaty of Nanking')
was imposed on China until today, the system has yielded results
which definitely have not persuaded the Chinese of the usefulness
nor the moral superiority of the Western practice of international
relations. The Western powers managed, by treaties as well as
by, outright aggression, to squeeze the lifeblood out of China. The
only equality found in those treaties "vas embodied in the so called
most-favored-llation clauses which did not benefit China but every
power interested in the exploitation of China.
.
Although the Chinese yielded to Western pressure, in their
hearts and minds they hoped that their concessions not be permanent. Rather like bamboo yielding to the wind, patriotic Chinese
have already waited a hundred years for the time when China is
strong enough to snap back and reassert her customary role of
the "Middle Realm". When the Communist government was established in m.ainland China, one could expect that the restoration
of internal order be accompanied by a reassertion of China as the
preeminent power in East Asia and, perhaps later, of the world"
Long before he assumed supreme control over the country, Mao
Tse-tung had given evidence time and again that he, like most
members 'of the Chinese elite in the twentieth century, had retained
attitudes toward the world that were as old as China itself.
Three elements of ancient China's concept of her role in the
world are clearly discernible in the current Great Tradition in
general and Mao' Tse-tung's thought in particular. They are the
glory of the ethnic Chinese, China's preeminent position in the
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world, and China's "completeness." As to the first element, here
is a passage from Su Tung-p'o, the great poet of the Sung dynasty.:
The barbarians are like beasts and not to be ruled on the same :
principles ~s Chinese. Wc;re one to attempt controlling them by the
great maxrms of reason It would tend to nothing but the greatest
confusion.'

It serves as an illustration of 110W old (and, in this particular
instance, perverse) an element it is. Present leaders are still imbued
with this idea as evidenced by Mao. For example, he asserted,
around 1939, that "in the history of Chinese civilization (chiefly
that of the Hans), agriculture and handicraft have always been
highly developed'? and he went on to enumerate various inventions
to prove his point, namely the special genius of his ethnic group,
the Chinese.
As to the second element, preeminence or centrality as expressed in chung kuo or "Middle Country," is also quite evident throughout Mao's utterances.
One need only recall the now famous
remark he made to Edgar Snow in an interview in 1936 with
regard to Outer Mongolia. With complete certitude, Mao predicted
that "when the people's revolution has been victorious in China,
the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the
Chinese federation, at its own will."? Today this remark sounds
amazing, almost fantastic; fifteen years have passed since the
establishment of the Chinese Communist state and Outer Mongolia"
seems farther removed from China than ever. Mao's prediction'
is even more amazing in light of the power relations prevailing at
that time. Mao's group in Yenan was still licking its wounds inflicted during the near-disastrous Long March. Besides, China' as a
whole was very weak indeed, not even being able to keep her own
house in order.
II

It is evident then, that on the subject of China's place in
the world, Chinese Ieaderships, and especially' he present one,
have at times been oblivious of the world as it Is. It has been
a recurrent article of faith with them that' in the end, China will
prevail in at least two ways. First, as the quotation from Mao
clearly suggests, irredenta will automatically revert. to China.
Secondly, China is seen to return. triumphant as the great example
1 Quoted in Hosea Ballou Morse, The International' Relations of the
Chinese Empire (London, 1910), Vols. I and III.
2 The; Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (Peking,

1954), p. 2.

,

Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York,
1963), p. 287.
3
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for the rest of the world. In ancient times cultural preeminence
was a fact; today, political supremacy is a goal. In another interview with Edgar Snow in 1936, Mao flatly stated that
"The Chinese revolution is the key factor in the world situation, and
its victory is heartily anticipated by the people of every country,
especially by t~e toiling I!1asses of the colonial countries. When t]1e
Chinese revolution comes Into full power, the masses of many colonial
countries will follow the example of China and win a similar victory
of their own."4

Nor has Mao abandoned the old idea of China as the t'ien hsia . 5
As early as 1939, he identified himself with the ancient view of
China's completeness when he said that
.
"Xs China's feudal society developed its commodity economy and so
carried within itself the embryo of capitalism, China would of herself.
have developed slowly into a capitalist society even if there had
been no influence of foreign capitalism.:"

In this respect he was and still is one with such people as the
reactionary Manchu court official Wo-jen and the monarchical
reformer K'ang Yuwei who argued that Western technology was
not wholly alien but rather that the seeds had been planted somewhere in China's antiquity. Completeness implies self-sufficiency
and hence Mao stands also on common ground with Lin Tsehsu who told Queen Victoria that China need not trade with anyone. This idea of self-sufficiency was also revealed in stu dentsponsored anti-Japanese campaigns in the 1920's and 1930's and has
been repeated incessantly by the Chinese Communists since 1958.
Thirdly, and lastly, as Mao Tse-tung ascended to supreme power
in 1949, he instinctively decided that the first order of business
for the new leadership lay at home: to consolidate its grip on
the country and to stay close to the people. The decision to
concentrate on domestic affairs was partly due to his awareness
of the special ties binding his Communist movement to the nationalism of the people without which he probably could not have
prevailed in the struggle against the former government. But I
am convinced that Mao was also influenced by the ancient Chinese
notion according to which foreign affairs are of subsidiary importance to domestic affairs. Keep your own house in order and
you need not worry about the outside world, said the ancients with
conviction. Strengthen yourself internally and the foreign threat
Ibid, p. 256.
.
Literally meaning "under heaven," the term has had the general meanlDfg of "everything under heaven," hence the connotation of all-inclusiveness,
o completeness.
6 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (New York, 1954), Vol. III, p. 77.
•

4
5
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will disappear, averred the Confucianist scholar of the nineteenjj,
century, self-consciously. Now in 1949, Mao came along and
proclaimed: We will build a new society and a new nation and
no one will dare attack us.
Quite understandably, Communist Chinese foreign policy has
beell subjected to many different interpretations. At one end of
the spectrum, a focus on the minutiae of individual actions and
reactions has led some to believe that China's foreign policy has
undergone innumerable changes. At the opposite end, the contention is heard that Peking's foreign policy has followed a prearranged
pattern and thus has not been subject to any changes made
necessary by unforeseen circumstances. I should like to divide
Chinese Communist foreign policy into two periods, the first from
1949 to about 1958 and the second since then. I do not maintain,
of course, that there was as neat and clearcut a division in reality
as my rather simple classification might suggest. Certain seemingly
permanent goals such as the reestablishment of China as a world
power and perhaps as the world power, firmly link the two
periods. At the same time, I strongly believe that foreign .policy
has been dictated primarily if not exclusively by domestic factors.
Hence when domestic conditions changed' rather radically around
1958, this change bore its imprint on China's view of the world.
But before we get to this point, let us first summarize Peking's
foreign activities from 1949 to 1958,
As I indicated earlier, during the first period the view from
Peking was that of a world divided into two implacably hostile
camps. In this respect, at least, it did riot differ at all from the
official positions taken by most major countries except India. 'I'he
United States was wedded to a "we-they" concept of world affairs
and the Soviet Union under Stalin and his immediate successors
concurred - from the other side of the fence, to be sure. Neither
of the two .superpowers nor the new Chinese leadership appeared
to pay much attention to the countries newly independent or on
the brink .of shedding their colonial rule.
The Chinese leadership viewed such arrangement as the best
of all possible worlds. The Soviet Union by virtue of ideology,
economy, and geography was the logical choice for a friend, or
to put it more accurately, for a source of badly needed material
support, both military and civilian.
The United States serve'd
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admirably well as the "bad guy" who could be blamed for all
past and present calamities at home. Most importantly. these
specific functions, assigned to both the Soviet Union and the
United States, were geared to the supreme task of preserving the
alignment between the leadership and the people established during
the critical period from 1937 to 1949.

The people were primarily concerned with material comfort.
Durillg the anti-Japanese war and the subsequent CIvil war, this
primary goal was shelved, but only temporarily, ill the interest of
national survival. Nationalism then Tilled supreme, But the war.
was over and even the murderous civil war had come to an end.
The people wanted to get back to "normal," that almost legendary
state of affairs in which one could reasonably expect to keep body
and soul together. To achieve their dream of an industrialized
China which would also fulfill ill the long run the primary
goal of the people, the new rulers needed machines, advice, and
loans. Indicative of how desperate this need was, Mao Tse-tung
himself journeyed to Moscow, the first time he left his native
land. The result, the Treatyof 1950, provided all of this, but the
Soviets knew that they could exact a rather stiff price. They insisted
on payment out of current production. Part of the payment "vas
going to be supervised by the Soviets through several so-called
joint stock companies. Some of them, while ostensibly shared on
an equal basis, were actually run for the benefit of the Soviet
Union : the two outstanding examples were the companies for oil
and "rare metals," a euphemism used for uranium. Besides, the
Soviets remained installed in the port cities of Talien (Dairen)
and Lushun (Port Arthur) in a style and manner of which the
Czars would have been proud. When a period of uncertainty
followed Stalin's death, the Chinese we're quick to seize the
opportunity to have the Soviets remove their enclaves in the ports
and joint companies. At the same time, Soviet aid "vas increased
considerably.
While material requirements were to be set by one foreign
power, the nationalistic aspirations of the people were
be met
by the role in which the .. United States was cast by the Peking
leadership. That America would eventually become Evil personified
was perhaps inevitable. First of all, America had participated in
the exploitation of China during the Manchu dynasty through the
most-tavored nation clauses and the so-called open door policy.
Secondly, America steadfastly supported· some of the most rotten

to
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elements on the political scene StIch as Ts'ao K'un for which lVlao,
back in 1923, condemned the United States as lithe most murderous
hangman." Thirdly, American governments turned a "deaf ear to
the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-sen and instead supported
the succession of warlords around Peking as the nominal rulers
of China until the warlord regimes were eliminated by the republi.
can forces. Finally, the Americans earned the hostility of the Communists by supporting the central government in its effort to
combat Mao Tse-tung's insurgents.

It may well be argued that these [aux pas, if indeed they really
were, must be balanced against the positive good done by the
United States, such as sending food and other forms of relief
to China. While such arguments have merit, it is also undeniably
true that no governing elite, and certainly no revolutionary group,
has ever weighed the merits and demerits of other nations in
strictly objective ways. It is both a requirement and a symptom
of a desperate age" that the present Chinese leadership needs a
"hate focus" to rally the people's support. As the experience of
eliminating landlords and rich farmers in 1951-1952 clearly showed,
domestic scapegoats are only of temporary value. Among the
possible foreign H candidates" for this function, the United States,
loomed largest. America's past policies to-ward China were a
contributing factor but no more than that. Other nations, including
Russia, had been exploiting China even more.
II

Yet other countries were 110t as suitable for a "hate focus.','
The 'Soviet Union was dead set against the Hold West" and, besides, '
was the only potential source of material assistance left 'to the
Chinese Communists. Britain and France had become minor powers
whose activities in and around China after the second world war
were negligible compared to the American presence. J apan.' of
course, had just been defeated and could therefore not convincingly
be presented to the people as a menacing force.

By comparison, the United States was not 0111y the most powerful country on earth but also, after. 1950, massively deployed around
the Chinese seaboard. Perhaps what recommended America most
as focus of officially directed venom was her hostility toward
the Soviet Union. The Chinese' leadership did everything in its.
power to convince its Soviet ally" that the United States was a
menace not only to China but to the Soviet Union as well.. By
I'

7

Schram, op. cit., p. 266.
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keeping tIle fires of conflict burning between the two superpowers,
the Chinese leaders hoped to achieve three objectives: first, maximum aid from the Soviet Union; secondly, a channel for popular
discontent against a foreign "menace ;" and thirdly, diverting
attention of stronger powers from China during the critical period
of building the muscles of an industrial economy.· The last objective
differed in no important respects from the ancient precept of
"controlling barbarians by using barbarians." In my opinion, one
of the main reasons for the strained relations between China and
the Soviet Union is this: the fear that a detente between Moscow
and Washington might redirect the energies of the two superpowers
to other areas of the world, and especially to China.

Under the seemingly idyllic conditions which prevailed shortly
after their takeover of state control, the Chinese Communists paid
relatively little attention to the newly independent countries of
Asia, later. As long as China could control" the' two great bar, barians and use them for material and psychological needs, the rest
of the world was presumed to fall into a preordained pattern of two
antagonistic camps. How little attention was given to the third
world can be deduced from the facile assumption made by the
Chinese leadership that all newly-independent states will inexorably
be drawn into the Communist orbit. Quite naturally, 'as avowed
activists the Communists were compelled to accelerate the "March
of History" by making friendly gestures to the leaders of Asia
and Africa. But proselytizing was conducted with an air of urbane
detachment. The first period of Chinese Communist foreign policy
was marked by grand gestures of "friendship," the grandest of
which was Chou En-lai's star performance at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955.
t t

But the world situation was not as idyllic as the Peking leadership had imagined in the first few years of rule. For one thing,
events in Asia and Africa seemed to evolve in a most un-Marxist
fashion. As the colonial powers granted independence, the new
political creations were not consumed by undying hatred of their
former masters. On the contrary, with few exceptions, African and
Asian states remained closely linked up with the West.

Secondly, the Chinese leadership had soon 'to recognize
the Soviet Union was simply too big to be manipulated.
Soviets made their own assessment of the world situation, and
did not believe any more than the Chinese leaders themselves

that
The
they
that
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America was a grave threat to China. Above all, and most naturally
the Soviet Union was' at amuch higher stage of development than
China and therefore had .a different set of policy goals. ,After
Stalin's death, the time had come to pay more attention ,to the
improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the; Soviet
Union and to safeguard, the substantial gains made in the development of the country. 'During the same period, the Soviet' Union
gave evidence that it had become truly a world power. In quick
succession, it acquired a hydrogen bomb stockpile, successfully
tested the world's first intercontinental ballistic missiles" and.
launched Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite.
As a result of these fundamental developments, Soviet foreign
policy underwent a marked change. As a genuine world power, the
Soviet Union became conscious of the 'tremendous devastation a
'nuclear war would bring to virtually all countries. The Soviet
rulers, therefore, edged away from the policy of overthrowing the
West by violent means and began to seek world triumph through
'non-military means, primarily through economic competition... At
the same time, the first attempts were made' to come to ':s~me
kind of rapprochement with the United States in order to forestall
an accidental nuclear war.

These events, occurring in 1957..58, fundamentally affected the
relationship between rulers and ruled within Communist China and
.led toa major .turningvpoint in China's .foreign policy. In the
first place, in view of the new emphasis on consumer goods at
home and economic competition abroad, the Soviets could not
greatly increase their assistance to Communist China. The material
aid (as apart from grants) that they continued to send was vastly
greater than that sent to any other country. Moreover, and contrary opinions held Tn some quarters, the industrial equipment
sent to China was the best the Soviets had and Soviet -technical
advisors were also of high caliber.
Had a more moderate vision prevailed in Peking, the existing
level of, Soviet, aid would perhaps have been sufficient. But the
new leadership was hell bent on a. quick and' triumphant inarch
to industrialization, and it was in no mood to slow down.' The
race between food output and population increase was already
slowly being lost, and more aid was needed to build IIp the industry
so that it may, throughexport, win this crucial battle. Secondly,
if, as it seemed, more aid was. not forthcoming, the leadership
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would lose face before the people for 'upholding· the Soviet Union
as the only true friend." Thirdly, Mao and his men felt that the
Soviet Union,' because of her' spectacular -feats,
rocketry, was
in a position 'to lend more 'aid to China 'without slackening her
arms production .program. Inferentially, Peking 'most likely" viewed
the new Soviet ernphasison consumer" goods' with a good deal of
disapproval.
-'
"
II

in

Not only did the, new, Soviet policy endangerChina's material
goals, it also threatened· to undermine her defense position, ,The
Chinese leadership watched the developing entente, between the
Soviet Union and the. United States with scorn and' anxiety. From
Peking it looked as if America would soon be able to ,shift her
armed might to the Pacific. and give encouragement to .allies if not
actually send her own troops to' invade .the .mainland. .Moreover,
the leadership saw in the relaxation of. tension between, the tWQ
superpowers nothing less than a betrayal of the Leninist revolutionary heritage, as indeed it was prone to point outyears later..
Another reason, for the leadership's disillusionment with the
Soviet Union was related to the psychological' function which Mao
Tse-tung had assigned to the United States. As stated earlier, the
image of Ainerica the Villainous had been used to' .explain away
domestic problems and to rally the people -behind the leadership.
As long as 'Ainericans were in the country, individual abuses and
cleverly concocted rumors could' arouse popular nationalism against
the United States in at least some segments' of the population.
But the farther" away from "1949 China. ~oved',' the more difficult
it was for the' people to-remember what '-'an American .looked like.
In short, America had become unreality.
As the economic crisis- inChina deepened, the .people took a
sharper look at the leadership's increasing vilification campaign
against this abstraction ~alled .America. What they found gave
them enough ree;tson to. gr~~ incredulous of the rulers', shrill
denunciation .of the United States and extravagant praise of the
Soviet Union. .That the' psychological weapon of..the American
"hate focus" lost .its potency among the people is, clearly understood when weremind ourselves' that popular nationalism thrives
ethnic antagonism. . It is 'also, probable that the very intensity
with which' Mao's men had conducted the anti-American. campaign
injected, deliberately or. not, an element .of racism.

on
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While no Americans, except a handful of expatriates, ·remained
China, tens of thousands of Soviet technicians and their dependents lived amidst the Chinese people. They lived, from, the
Chinese point of view, in immense splendor. Staying in the plushest
accormnodations available, in many cases using the only cars around
and carrying home from commissary stores food items and ,othe;
products denied to the people, the Russians by their mere presence
underscored to the people the basic inconsistency of the leadership's
foreign policy. Besides, under conditions of a worsening economic
crisis,' Russian conduct and behavior was probably increasingly
thought of as boorish and overbearing. As Americans know only
too well from their own experiences abroad, such antagonism cannot be avoided even under the most ideal conditions. As a 'result,
it became very difficult for the Chinese people to understand why
one white and former colonial power was condemned in absents,
while members of another white and formerly colonial power,
luxuriating and very much present, were to be adlllated as the
"only-true friends."
.
i11

In sum, inconsistency in policies' toward the two main foreign
powers plus insufficient gains in industry -and agriculture at, home
pointed to eventual disaster for the leadership unless the material
and nationalistic demands of the' people could somehow yet be
satisfied, A sharp change in policies was clearly called for." In the
field of foreign relations, .Mao ordered .hostility toward the Soviet
Union, an intensified hate campaign against the United States, and
a harder (and more realistic) view of the uncommitted countries.
'These momentous changes were accompanied at home by a series
of programs which could ·be .traced back in one way or another
to the' ancient concept of a self-sufficient China. All of these new
policies, foreign and domestic, had one characteristic in common:
they were the unmistakable signs of .a desperate age. The Chinese
leadership decided to go for broke.
The over-all objective of Chinese Communist foreign policy
since 1958 has been to establish a new t'ien 'hsia a new order in
the .world in which China would play the central role as she .had
in .pre-revolutionary eras. Acknowledgment of Chinese suzerainty
was not tobe in. the form of gifts, but in terms of political allegiance
This view, as fantastic
it may seem, was not without precedent.
As stated earlier, ·Maohad for some time believed that the 'Chinese
Communist revolution will serve as' the model 'for all other ex~
colonial countries. Evidently, he was determined to make his
J

as
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prophecy come true. Thus, the decision was made to maintain
relations with established governments in the uncommitted countries
but at the same time also to concentrate more on rebel forces,
communist or otherwise, wherever theycould be found,
The result was a two-pronged attack, one at the official level
and the other at the unofficial level. Due to the worsening economic
,crisis at home, the Chinese leadership could not hope to match
the Soviet Union, let alone the United States, in terms of material
aid and thus had to place heavier emphasis on verbal bouquets of
U'eternal friendship" and the like.
This meager program was
implemented by deliberate attempts to isolate China's greatest competitor in the developing world, India. India, after a very slow
beginning, gathered speed in her economic development just when
China's was flagging. Coupled with asttlte diplomacy, India's economic development gained the attention of an increasing number
of African and Asian states. If this trend is not stopped, the
Chinese leadership thought, China's attempts to build itself up as
the only model for economic development would come to naught.
'The suppression of Tibet in 1959 failed to divert any significant
proportion of Indian resources into armaments. In fact, it was
perhaps galling for the Peking leadership to see the Indians faithfully adhering to the pancn shila policy of peaceful coexistence
and ignoring the ominous rumblings in neighboring Tibet.
But the Peking leadership did not, or perhaps could not, brook
any further delay in its plan to isolate India. Accordingly, it began
to malign the Indian government, accusing it of aggression and
interference in Chinese domestic matters. As it turned out, it was
not too likely a story and stronger medicine was called for.
Thus, toward the end of 1962, the Chinese finally mounted
their attack against India on a broad front from the Aksai Chin
sector of Ladakh in the west to the North East Frontier Agency
(NEFA) region in the east. This time, the Chinese strategern
worked: the Indian government took cognizance of the Chinese
threat and began to strengthen its armed forces. The immediate
result was a drain on .India's economy. But shortly thereafter, and
much to Peking's chagrin; not only the United States and Great
Britain but also the Soviet Union increased their military aid to
India. Thus, one of Mao's goals, to make India appear as a stooge
of Western imperialism in the eyes of the uncommitted countries,
'could not be reached. The reverses suffered by India at the hands
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of Chinese troops did create doubts in not a few minds in.:Asia
and Africa as to India's stature asa great power, but this negative
effect was more than cancelled out by feeling of disgust at naked
aggression which India skillfully exploited for all its worth.

The most momentous change in Communist China's foreign
policy was its decision to turn against the Soviet Union. Those 'in
the West who claimed that they "had known it all along" could
point to several events in history when the Chinese and the Russians
had not been on the best of terms with each other. I do' not wish
to chronicle Russo-Chinese relations here; it has already been 'done
by Harry Schwartz and others," Still, for the purposes of our
discussion, it is worthwhile to summarize that history in three
stages.
During the imperial period prior to 1917, Russia had managed
to push back the frontiers of a weakening Ch'ing dynasty. Outright
.colonization in the vast stretches of Inner Asia was paralleled by
treaty arrangements whereby large 'tracts along the Pacific sea-.
board were "handed over to Russia: The Czarist government also
participated in the economic exploitation of China by means of the
most-favored-nation clauses and ··carved out a neat little stake . .in
the 'Chinese East.ern Railway across tIle Northeast of China.
A second period of unfortunate relations occurred between 1920
and 1949 between the Chinese Communist insurrectionary movement
and, the Comintern headquarters in Moscow. During thatTong
time, the 'Chinese Communists benefited from the organization of
their 'Party by some very capable agents sent from. Moscow and
also from the training of many future leaders. of China in schools
in the Soviet Union. But the liabilities created by this relationship
were much greater. I already mentioned the Moscow-driected policy
of starting revolution in the cities which ended in. near-disaster
for the Chinese comrades.. Also prominently mentioned in connectionwith the present spate of mutual recriminations was Stalin's
alleged order after the second world war against a break with the
Kuomintang:: In fact, it appears that Stalin either miscalculated
or deliberately attempted to .sacrifice the Chinese Communists:
i

The final stage of relations between the Soviet Union' and
t~e Chinese Communists prior to the latter's assumption of state
8 Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars (New York, 1964),
Howard "Boorman . et al., Moscavv-Pekin.g .Axis .(New York, 1957))' Klaus
Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York, 1963), and several others.':
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power was during the brief Soviet occupation of the Northeast.
The Soviets managed to strip.. that .unfortunate region of everything
of possible industrial-use, TIle value of, the removed propertyat least one billion American dollars-s-actually understates the blow
that this plunder inflicted on the Chinese economy. To fully understand what Soviet "liberation" meant to China, we must remind
ourselves that the Northeast was at that time the only center of
heavy industry anywhere in China. Furthermore, the Soviet armies
did little to encourage the acquisition of the Northeast by the
Chinese Communists. Faithfully carrying out agreements reached
between Moscow and the Nationalist government, the Soviet troops
waited in many cases until the arrival of Nationalist troops before
pulling: back behind their own: frontier, Thus it is .only
slight
exaggeration to say that Mao's men finally triumphed in spite of
Stalin and the Soviet Union,

a

Adding" to this long history of humiliation by Russia and the
Soviet Union the immediate 'sources 'of disillusionment, one begins
to understand why Mao Tse-tung opted for' hostility against his
mighty neighbor to the north. 'A policy of deliberate suppression
of everything Russian was inaugurated in 1958. Soviet technicians
were harassed by what the Soviets now call "political indoctrination" and the order, promulgated only two years earlier, to introduce
the Cyrillic alphabet for some non-Chinese languages in China.'s
West, was rescinded. It took two full years before Mao achieved
one of his goals, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. Later he
denounced this product of 'his own policy as II a stunning and
treacherous blow" to China.
For, the first time since accession to power, the Chinese leadership followed a consistent foreign policy, blasting away at both
giant "barbarians." I am quite certain that the Peking leaders
conduct their dispute with the Soviet Union ,primarily for domestic
purposes. Unlike in the Soviet Union where none of the Chinese
statements and only the most important Soviet charges appear in
mass publications, in Chinaany and all recriminations, Chinese and
Russian, are faithfully reproduced in all national newspapers. The
leaders hope by this to prove to the people that China has at
long last stood up to the mightiest nations on earth. They also
seem to suggest that a combination of' consistent hostility against

the two superpowers 'and a,' program of ,autarchy can solve the
enormous problems at home.
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There is no reason to doubt that the defiant attitude taken
against both the United States and the Soviet Union gave the
Peking leadership much-needed popular support. But there are
strong indications that this supports was only of fleeting duration
Nationalism, after all, must inevitably take second place to the
popular goals of material comfort and personal peace of mind. It
may thus be conjectured that the intransigent policies against the
Soviet Uni011 have so far failed to tap the full potential of Chinese
popular nationalism because of the persistent and apparently insoluble problems of livelihood at home.
I should like to peer cautiously into the future and predict
the most likely policies the Chinese rulers will follow toward
certain specific areas of the world, and the probable results that
these policies will have, Let .me make it quite clear that the continuing elements in Chinese attitudes toward the world, as outlined
earlier, do not represent the entire equation. Although there is no
reason to think that Mao Tse-tung has changed his mind on irredenta since his remarks in 1936, I am certain that he does not
intend to use physical force to enlarge the territory of China." The
key phrase in that quotation, at its own will", is still "correct"
today. ·True, it is a reflection of traditional attitudes on the subject
of China's position in the world. But, at the same time, it is' also
the expression of a new element equally important ill the formation
of foreign policy ill Communist China.
II

That new element is, of course, the Marxist-Leninist ideology
as interpreted and applied by Mao himself. Limitation of space
does -not permit a detailed account of that ideology and its ,rele- ~
vance to the problem of Chinese relations with the world except
two of its cardinal points in the shortest possible manner.' One
is that the' most important level of analysis of international rela-'
tions is at the class level and 110t at the state level. The other point
is that 'the ·chief characteristic of human relations is uninterrupted
class 'struggle. Hence, revolutions are held not only to be inevitable
but- also to be generated exclusively within societies. Therefore, it
is quite unnecessary and fruitless to try and create such upheavals
through external force, although, of course, it is considered the
sacred duty of a Communist to nurture insurrections. Secondly,
the Chinese leadership will, in my opinion, refrain from forcefully
annexing Southeast Asia for wholly practical reasons.
Yet despite what I consider to .be strong theoretical and practical injunctions against it, the conquest of rich lands south of China
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by an irresistible juggernaut has nonetheless appeared as. an awe
some probability to many non-Chinese. As recently as 1964', a map
allegedly·. published in Peking in 1954, wasprominently reprinted

in various American 'newspapers and. magazines, Showing China's
boundaries in ·1800, themap gave the .impression that such countries
as Burma,Thailand," Vietnam, and se.ctionsofMalaya had been
integral .parts of ·the Chinese empire. Accompanying commentaries
not only 'reinforced this impression but concluded that the Peking
leadership is' determined' to incorporate .these areas' at the next
opportune moment.
.: This imputation of intentions' is, in my opinion, faulty on
several counts. First ·of all, Southeast; Asian .areas . beyond the
present Chinese boundaries were not physically' occupied but were
merely under the suzerainty of Chinese ,dynasties. As a matter of
historical record, the 'present Chinese leadership has never·· laid
claim to any territory' in Southeast Asia except a small strip along
the Burmese border, arid, that" issue has recently been, settled' to' the
apparent satisfaction of bothcountries,
.
Secondly, I am convinced that the Peking leaders- have probably
no desire .and "certaill1y nov need to physically .OCCUPY Southeast
Asia. The usual argument made in the West ill support of the
incorporation thesis, that Peking covets' Southeast Asia as one vast
ricebowl capable of .feeding her' hungrymillions, does', not persuade
me. Southeast Asia' does not produce so 'much food 'at<present
that the surpluswould make an, appreciable "impact'on \he :Chinese
economy. The 'only rice-exporting 'country 'of any"'corfsequence\
Burma, produces a surplus of that comm~dity,·-·th~t is quite miniscompared'to' China's 'needs. An even better': case-against-the
, ~irice bowl": the~is" is being presented'Qy' the periodicfood 'purchases
which Communist China will be forced', to make' for :an" .indefinite
p,~riod.·Prev~nted by ,their Ideology.' the "Peking leaders.. could 110t
turn to the. United States which enjoys (or suffers under, as some
would say)" the largest food surplus in the world. Peking instead
has turned. to Canada, and Australia but only secondarily
Burma
and. France,". The "ricebowl".. thesis, . is also faulty..because .even if
So~theast'Asia had .an enol'lll.ous"sutplus·of ~.o6gJitdo~s not 'f9lJ~~

cule

to

9 It has been argued by some that Communist China turned to Canada
and. Australia because wheat is cheaper than rice, This argument is valid
as to 'the :price .dffferential between the two commodities, but it' obscures
thje fact that while, there is a ,wheat.glut on, the' world market, there is
Practically
rice; surplus at all.

no'
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that physical .occupation of the area would be the ,best way ·to
obtain the food.

Thirdly, it is most unlikely that the Chinese' .leadership-wanjg
to conquer Southeast Asia to:' provide anautlet for China's 'huge
population. A persistent thesis in the West, it appears to have some
merit .to the casual observer. Rather than transporting the food
intoChina: so the' argument goes, one 'could save. on transportation
cost -by shipping thei'masses" .down into Boutheast Asia' instead.
Such movewould seem to 'have the added advantage, 'of rendering
the area secure for a new and glorious empire.
-Everi when granting that conquering Southeast Asia may yield
some' economic benefits to the Chinese leadership, it is doubtful
that it .would ever contemplate such move. Physical conquest is
beset-with some .stagg~~ilJ.g.. liabilities. First, physical occupation
would..\.dumpall the-problems-s-and they are vexing and various,
.indeed-e-which are currently bedevilling the leaders of, Southeast
Asian countries into the lap of the Peking elite. 'Secondly, occupation would trigger a wave of popular uprisings which would pale
even the recent great Moslem and Tibetan rebellions inside China
into insignificance. Rampant nationalism in Southeast Asia. would
make -the Chinese position there untenable.. Thirdly, occupation of
'Southeast Asia would.. make China's strategic position impossibly
difficult. : ·It would exparidChina's frontiers to ·include an enormously long :coastline . which China's forces' simply could ;':"not
adequately defend. Finally, the Peking leadership has probably. 110
territorialdesigns on Southeast Asia because conquest would 'defeat
China's continuing attempts to become the center :of the: world,
How could the, Chinese .Ieadership Iiope to .have all but the .EuroAmerican "island" look to· it for political leadership and thus.pay
tribute, .modern-style? . By attacking Southeast Asia.: China would
gain 'a region and lose 'a world. .

In .sum, we can expect the Chinese leadership to continue its
present policiesvtoward-Southeast Asia "without major modifications. 1t ~il.1'continue'to seek to reestablish China~s'hegenl0ny'over
the area by a combination of threats and blandishments. Its: pro-

of

bable optimum goal is the' establishment
indigenous' Communist
governments willing' to supportPeking rather than Moscow 'in 'its
bid
for..world.
leadership.
,
.

. A~" to the .rest of' Asia, ifJt wishes to 'establish: ·the.kind of
dominance I 'have alluded to,' the Chinese leadership will have to

PEKING AND THE··WORLD

363

;ontend with two major powers. One of them, Japan, is not likely
to become an attractive model for industrialization because, first,
she is already far too advanced, and, secondly, her own experiences
in industrial "take-off" in the nineteenth century do not --seem
relevant to today'sproblems in Asia, Africa;" and Latin America.
But Japan is in a position to extend sufficient amounts of aid and
technical advice to the rest of the world to -d-ull the edge of revolutionary fervor and thus to lessen China's attractiveness which,
because of her own economic problems, will necessarily be confined
to the art of successful insurrection. ' At the same time, the Chinese leadership obviously feels that
it cannot subject Japan to the same treatment as the two superpowers. This dilemma will persist in the foreseeable ·future and
will greatly increase the already quite noticeable vexation vis-a-vis
Japan. The dilemma will manifest itself .by --a cycle of patient
attempts to forge closer economic links and occasional periods of
political hostility marked by dogmatic rigidity. During the latter
phase of the cycle, Communist China will, as has happened before,
be sharply reminded that Japan is far too powerful economically
to be intimidated politically. So the grand dream will persist in
Peking that some day somehow Japanese political life will swing
into an alliance with Communist China. Meanwhile, the Chinese
leadership will continue to muster all its persuasive powers in
order to establish close economic links by which. the fabulous
industrial might of Japan might come to the rescue of her cultural
ancestor. It is rather doubtful that this policy will be successful,
but it is also certain that the policy must b-e pursued. Communist
China has no other alternative.

The other major power, India, is of an entirely different sort.
Industrially, she is far behind Japan but precisely because of this
relative backwardness, she will continue to exert a much gre-ater
appeal among the developing countries of the world. - For this
reason, the Chinese Communist leadership will continue to view
India as much the greater rival of the two. But" the range of
possible direct Chinese action against India will be severely limited.
.An attempt to occupy India is, of course, out of -question not because
I judge the Chinese incapable of doing- ·so but rather ·because of
the enormous problems of administration -that such move would
entail. If occupation of Southeast Asia - can be ruled - out, then
the conquest of India certainly must be, too. Hence, Communist
China will, from time to time, resort to the only weapon at her
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command to slow down' Indian industrial development ,- and, ' to
lower India's prestige around the world. In short, we may, expect
repeat performances of the November 1962 border clashes,
'
That such moves are not only harmful to India but also fraught
With' grave consequences for China is, I hope, obvious. As far as
'India's industrialization drive is concerned, future Chinese border
attacks will succeed only in the event that India's increased military
budget is 'not underwritten by some outside powers.
"
The issue of India's prestige is intimately linked up with this
problem. If India should, for some reason, be compelled to obtain
military supplies only from the United States (or her allies) or
from the Soviet" Union (or her allies), attacks against Indiacould
coriceivably "be quite profitable to the Peking leadership. ',', India
wouldin effect become committed and hence lose both the leader,
ship and the sympathies of the " third world." But the chances for
one-sided military' aid' do not appear bright at the present' time.
The Soviet Union has only recently concluded an agreement' with
India for the delivery of military equipment, and Westem powers
can" be exp-ected '~to' continue' their aiel. As long as" this pattern is
preserved, it will 'take relatively little effort on India's part to
convince' the rest of the uncommitted"countries that her increased
attention to military matters is not to sharpen the lines of the
global confrontation but to protect herself against a hostile' China.
In sum, Communist China is likely to 'become increasingly powerless
to 'do anything about India's economic development and hence
about her appeal as a .developmental. model for other countries.
'At the same time, 'the 'Chinese leadership will not move nearer'
its goal of world leadership by "bypassing" India. Because of" their
domestic, problems, _the Chinese rulers will notbe-able to compete
successfully with 'any of half a dozen or more countries in the field
of economic aid nor will they be able to persuade many other
developing countries to follow China's example. Two alternative
roads to predominance will remain. First, China will probably
exploit to the fullest the fact that she now possesses atomic
weapons. Whether such propaganda could be successfully used
to bludgeon neighboring countries into political submission, I rather
doubt.. The leaders of these countries are highly astute and thus
not likely to overlook the fact that a handful of atomic weapons
does not change the strategic balance. Nor are these leaders innocent of the art of exploiting any kind of Chinese saber-rattling,
atomlc or non-atomic, to their own advantage.
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In:Africa~. .and other areas remote...from China, the Chinese
rulers can ;U~y ,: thy issue .of atomic; weapons only in a" persuasive
·manner.: 'It is .lkiely that -the present ~ leadership! in Peking will try
to convince the people of Africa. and ·Latil) America that only by
f~llowill;g mainland China's .path could they .attain the .status symbol
p·~r. excellence·. But time is eroding the foundations ;of:\$uch argu..
ment. As time goes on, it will take less of, .an industrial-establishm~nt to vduplicate in dozens of other countries. China's feat of
Inanufacturing a few atomic bombs, Before too long, Egypt: and
Israel and, with a change of heart, perhaps, also India will ..have
. '. liB
. b ·"
theIr
. am

The other alternative policy is actually more frightful if orily
it might. be relied on .more..heavily. Due to her. increasing desperation;··J expect China to. redouble her efforts to. foster rebel movements in .most parts of the world, Her current activities in Eastic~ntralAfrica will probably be duplic.ated elsewhere. . The people
living in .those .countries will be the victims of political instability
and especi~llyof:~conon1ic devastation. In a situation such as this,
is inevitable .that rebel. movements will . emerge which will '; find
C0111rnuni~t~··Ch~na,~s fanatically militant posture worthy of emular
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However, It does not follow that the rebel 'leaders, once in
power, ·will··steer their countriesInto-modern-style tributary reI a:.
tions with Communist China. Such expectation ,is' based, 'it would
seem to me, on the assumption that rebel leaders are. political
babes in the woods. Such assumption is, in my opinion, generally
unwarranted. Leaders in the developing nations, present .and future,
can be expected to chart their' own course. of .Rational development.
Assuming that neither the 'West nor' the Soviet Union will be stupid
enough to alienate the .leaders of the uncommitted countries, these
leaderswillcontinue to, pickand choose among available alternati~~s and ~cfd some of' their own. ideas to conform to 'local- conditions.
Peking's policy toward the United States will continue to be
guided.by the . leadership's need for diverting popular frustrations,
induced by' an increasingly .hopeless Iife, from; coalescing. into open
rebellion.. Economic disasters at 'home . will continue. to .be .blamed
on "U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Kuominating bandit.clique,"
In this connection, I should .like to say that the' so-calfedHtwo
China" issue will be more often used by the Chinese leadership
as pretext for refusing .to reach a settlement; with the United
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States. I am convinced that even if Taiwan were under' Communist
rule, the leadership's attitude toward the United States would' nor
be substantially different. Hence, the Chinese rulers will ''':remain
chained to ostensibly implacable hostility vis-a-vis America. At
the same time, China can be expected, to 'seek further, iilfonna'l
contacts with the United States, at the ambassadorial' level 'as 'at
present or perhaps even at some higher level. The, failure 'to reach
anyrnajor agreements, inherent in such contacts,' could be used
'the .appropriate time, to persuade .other countries that 'th~
Peking leadership had striven diligently to' lessen tensions o~tween
the two great Pacific nations but, predictably, that efforts came
to naught through American "truculence."

at..

For several reasons, Peking's relations with the Soviet' 'Union
both' at the Party and government levels will be the most difficult
and: the most crucial. As far as the Chinese leadership is concerned
it will probably be unable to overcome a dilemma. On the ori~
hand,' China must eventually receive massive economic aid;' .at 'least
on, the same scale as once provided by the Soviet Union.' But on
the other 'hand, this would mean, of course, the presence of thousands of technicians and advisors in China. The reintroduction
of large numbers of Russians (or, for that matter, other Europeans)
would undermine Peking's other foreign policy requirement, namely
the necessity of pursuing an essentially hostile policy toward all
white and former colonial powers.
There does not seem any way out of this predicament. Without
massive aid, Peking's plans for industrialization will remain' shelved
for a very longtime. But given the desperate situation at' home,'
the Chinese leadership will not soon be able to sacrifice "consistency" in its antagonistic foreign policy for the sake of industrial
'development. By putting the Russians in the same' category with
their fellow Caucasians, the Americans, the leadership can' only
hope to dampen the people's despair by offering the vicarious
thrill of thumbing noses at all the white and developed nations of
the world.
The Soviets, for their part, could sharpen Peking's' dilemma
at times and in manner of their own choosing by offering to resume
massive' material assistance. Regardless of who happens to be
in power in the Soviet Union, he might use 'such strategem because
he knows that the Chinese would be forced to reject his offer.
Rejection' will
a certaintymot only because of the necessary
consistency" in foreign policy, discussed earlier. The leadership

be
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of the world Communist movement is also at stake. Thus, a
properly formulated offer of aid by the Soviet Union could place
the Chinese leadership in a most embarrassing position. The
Chinese would have to choose between (a) accepting Soviet aid
at the price of subordinating themselves to the Soviets, and. (b)
refusing such aid and continuing the struggle for the leadership
of the world Communist movement.
Regardless of which of these two alternatives China would
choose, the leaders of national Communist parties would see little
reason for supporting Peking's claim to leadership." On the one
hand, if China should refuse Soviet aid, her main appeal in coun..
tries where the Communists remain out of power, would be
confined to tactics and strategies of staging successful revolutions.
In countries where Communists are in power, this appeal would
obviously have vanished. As to the central task of economic
development, Communist governments would not be too likely. to
rely on an autarkic China but rather turn to the Soviet Union.
If" on the other hand, China should accept aid from the Soviet
Union, her goal of controlling the world Communist movement
would become all the more difficult to achieve. She would, in
effect, acknowledge to other Communist leaders the fact that she,
too, is m an economically inferior position. Under such circumstances, the Chinese rulers could not help but induce other Communist
leaders to follow their lead and appeal to the Soviet Union for
economic aid. Insum, Communist China's foreign policies, more
closely related than those of other countries to domestic conditions,
will become more belligerent but not reckless. They will, therefore, probably fall short of Peking's main goals, namely, the leadership of the world Communist movement and a system of political
tributary relations between China and most if not all economically
underdeveloped countries.
I should like to conclude my remarks on the future of Peking's

relations with the world with a warning that the West's influence
will further decrease. This dire prediction may appear to contradict much of what I have said up to now. My belief that the
Chinese leadership will neither be able to wrest control of the
world Communist movement from the Soviet Union nor become the
great model of economic construction for most of the world may
be construed by some to mean that the world situation favors the
West's position. Such assumption may prove fatal to the West
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because, unfortunately, it is held by 'Some :of· the' 'most influential
men' in, the United States.
,..,
I .maintain that up, to the. present time, thereis every .irlclicC\tlon
that the most important leaders of the' West understand -n~ithet
thefundamental nature of, contemporary insurrections .nor th.~:,.pr~~
cise scope and limitations of the .roles that Communist, China can'
and probably will play in such situations.' Official American"statements on' the nature of the Vietnamese conflict and ,'some ~ of the
reasons .given for the presence' of the Seventh Fleet 'in: Asian waters
make' it unmistakably clear that success against Communism is .
still .sought primarily' with the 'gun.
'
Curiously, some of' the' most persistent critics of American
foreign policy like Walter Lippmann, also SUCClll11b 'to' whdi"I 'consider a mistaken assumption, When Lippmann, for example; argues
that the'United Statesrmust withdraw from Vietnam arid Korea
because 'of her military weakness against vastly superior manpower,
he' unwittingly 'arid; judging 'by his remarks at 'other times, also
quite uniritendedly perpetuates a notion 'which should' have rbeen
discarded two decades ago, namely, that the present conflict.Tn
Vietnam', 'and 'similar' conflicts elsewhere in the future are of an
essentially military nature.
Likewise, Lippmann's Caner others') advocacy of .avstraregic
withdrawal from the Asian continent is made for the samewrong
reason. A call for the reestablishment of a "natural" defense line
from Japan: through Taiwan to-the Philippines because' "America
is' a naval power'Iseems strangely removed from the 'revolutionary
facts of life in mid-twentieth century and harks back ~to:Mah'an
if not Mayflower.
It is nothing less than amazing that almost thirty years after
Mao" 'Ts'e-tung first· wrote extensively on' the' kind of wariwhich
can no longer be called unconventional aria" after the" events ,- i~r
Vietnam, Cuba, and Congo" some men, should still speak ofrnilitary
solutions to non-military .problems.. But .since this .is obviously the.
case, let me state: in one .sentence thenature,or,-rather·-t.h'e-,.ongin·,
of the kind of war fought on the periphery of China. Such-wars
come: about neither-through 't4e military weakness: of a-government
nor by foreign military intervention : they are spawned by economic
stagnation, social, inequity, 'and political corruption..;

Itfollowsthatrevolutions will' occur: (and some 'will 'undoubti11 countries, regardless' whether continental "or insu-

edly' succeed)
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Jar, where such conditions exist. During the insurrectionary period)
Peking's aid may in some cases be little more that verbal encouragewent. Hence, if, for example, the Philippines should witness the
triumph of a resurgent Huk movement, the Seventh Fleet would
hardly be a suitable means of preventing it.
But after a revolutionary leadership has taken over the reigns
of government, Communist China (and the Soviet Union) become
of, great .importance by rendering all-kinds of assistance, including
weapons and the training of guerilla fighters of a neighboring
country. Moreover, from Communist China's POi11t ·of view, it is
more "profitable" to assist in. such manner Communist governments
in insular countries as opposed to continental .countries, Given
about the same amount of assistance (and, as I have made it clear,
such aid from Communist China will continue t~ be necessarily
quite limited), a revolutionary leadership on an island can reexport
such assistance to more places thana similar group 'in a landlocked
nation. Of particular strategic -- importance in this regard are
Zanzibar' and Ceylon'. Communist China could, if and when Communist regimes are established in those islands, send aid there
with impunity because of, th.e Western principle of the "freedom
of the seas." I-Ience, a force 'such as the Seventh Fleet would -be
powerless to prevent SlICh assistance. Furthermore, in part because
of the same principle, these island governments could, export agents
and material not. only to the nearest countries but to many others
as well at the lowest possible cost and risk.

